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Expansion of land area used for agriculture is a leading cause of biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas 
emissions, particularly in the tropics. One potential way to reduce these impacts is to increase food 
production per unit area (yield) on existing farmland, so as to minimize farmland area and to spare 
land for habitat conservation or restoration. There is now widespread evidence that such a strategy 
could benefit a large proportion of wild species, provided that spared land is conserved as natural 
habitat (1). However, the scope for yield growth to spare land by lowering food prices and, hence, 
incentives for clearance (“passive” land sparing) can be undermined if lower prices stimulate 
demand and if higher yields raise profits, encouraging agricultural expansion and increasing the 
opportunity cost of conservation (2, 3). We offer a first description of four categories of “active” 
land-sparing mechanisms that could overcome these rebound effects by linking yield increases with 
habitat protection or restoration (table S1). The effectiveness, limitations, and potential for 
unintended consequences of these mechanisms have yet to be systematically tested, but in each 
case, we describe real-world interventions that illustrate how intentional links between yield 
increases and land sparing might be developed. 
 
FOUR LINKING MECHANISMS. Land-use zoning. Zoning some land for conservation and some for 
agriculture limits agricultural expansion, provides security to landholders investing in agricultural 
productivity, and can incentivize yield increases to compensate for the scarcity of available land 
[“Boserupian innovation” (4)]. However, zoning does not drive yield increases in agricultural zones 
directly. Hence, there is a risk of its leading to displacement of production outside the regions 
subject to zoning. Such “leakage” might be less likely where zoning restrictions are placed on the 
expansion of export commodities for which demand shows high price elasticity, rather than on 
staple foods (2). 
 
In Costa Rica, after the government zoned forests as off-limits for agricultural expansion, the rate of 
clearance of mature forests halved (5). Export-oriented agriculture shifted from cattle pasture 
toward high-yielding pineapple and banana crop, (for fuller information and references for this and 
other case studies, see supplementary materials (SM). Beef production declined, albeit temporarily, 
whereas production of pineapples and other crops has continued to increase. The risk of leakage 
could be reduced by prioritizing lessproductive land for conservation to minimize loss of production 
and by combining zoning with other interventions (6). 
 
Economic instruments, such as payments, land taxes, and subsidies. In principle, these can be 
tailored to stimulate yield increases, discourage habitat conversion, and make receipt of benefits 
conditional on habitat conservation. Incentive programs often involve contracts, and difficulties can 
arise through hidden actions and information asymmetries. For example, recipients might conceal 
breaches of contract or accept money for actions they would have carried out anyway. These risks 
can be reduced by building trust, understanding the people and places where interventions occur, 
developing cost-effective monitoring, and enforcing contracts. 
 
An incentive program that has successfully spared land has been implemented in the Spiti Valley of 
Himalayan India (7). In exchange for designating land set-asides for the recovery of snow leopard 
prey, herders receive payments and technical assistance to reduce livestock losses to snow leopards 
(improving yield) and to organize insurance against losses. The program, which was developed 
collaboratively with herders and local government to ensure that it addresses local priorities, 
reduced snow leopard predation of livestock by two-thirds in its first 4 years and eliminated snow 
leopard killings. 
 
Spatially strategic deployment of technology, infrastructure, or agronomic knowledge. Land sparing 
can be encouraged if yield-enhancing measures (such as technical advice on soil, nutrient, or water 
management; improved germplasm; multiple cropping; integrated pest and disease control; and 
improved access to roads or irrigation) are intentionally directed toward certain areas and not 
others. Such interventions could enhance yields and reduce post-harvest losses in established 
farmlands, while avoiding the risks involved in stimulating agriculture in areas of extensive natural 
habitat (8). Increasing yields of staple crops, for which demand is inelastic to price changes, appears 
more likely to support land sparing than increasing yields of luxury or export crops (2). A limitation of 
strategic deployment is that it encourages yield increases directly but only protects natural habitats 
indirectly, by reducing pressure for conversion. It will often be necessary to combine this mechanism 
with others, especially land-use zoning. A key challenge is to ensure that benefits and costs are not 
unfairly distributed. 
 
In the Philippine province of Palawan, introduction of irrigation helped lowland rice farmers produce 
two crops per year rather than one (9). They met their higher labor demands by employing upland 
farmers, who used part of their new-found income to invest in fertilizers, which improved their own 
yields and reduced their need to clear forests. Deforestation rates in the uplands halved. Larger and 
poorer households were those most likely to benefit. Nevertheless, addressing social justice remains 
practically and ethically complex, is often hampered by unequal power relations and may often 
require additional measures, such as increasing nonagricultural job opportunities for marginalized 
groups. 
 
Standards and certification. Voluntary standards could link yield growth to conservation by requiring 
habitat protection, defining sustainable yield-increasing practices, monitoring compliance, and 
rewarding good performance with market access and price premiums. Sparing or restoring natural 
habitats at farm scale can be more beneficial for biodiversity than certifying lower-yielding “wildlife-
friendly” practices (10). To maximize their contribution to landscape-level conservation, certification 
schemes should widen their focus from individual farms to coordinated actions by groups of farmers 
in places where potential conservation gains are greatest. 
 
Participating farmers in the Ibis rice scheme in northern Cambodia receive technical assistance and a 
price premium, which makes it easier to afford simple technology and additional labor (11). At the 
same time, they agree to a village-level land-use plan that protects habitats. These agreements are 
maintained in part by social pressure: A major infraction would put everyone's benefits at risk. 
Together with other initiatives, the scheme has reduced deforestation and increased rice harvests. It 
illustrates one way of making landscape conservation relevant and feasible for individual farmers. 
 
CONDITIONS AND SYNERGIES. Some conditions make successful implementation of land-sparing 
mechanisms more likely. Labor- and capital-intensive technologies and practices are those most 
likely to be conducive to land sparing (8). Knowledge networks can also help improve 
implementation of sustainability standards or payment schemes (12). For example, thousands of 
Landcare groups in Australia share knowledge on accessing funds, conserving habitats, and 
improving agricultural techniques. Landcare participants are more likely to protect and restore 
native vegetation and to adopt practices that sustain agricultural yields (13). Markets also matter. 
For commodities with globalized markets and elastic demand, limiting rebound effects through 
demand-side measures and restrictions on land use will be crucial. In the case of staples grown by 
smallholders, supporting them to increase their yields (and thereby, limit leakage) might be more 
appropriate. 
 
Each mechanism is most likely to be effective if implemented in synergy with others, so that strong 
protection is provided to habitats and adequate support is provided to farmers to increase their 
yields. Command-and-control zoning policies will more likely be accepted as legitimate if 
accompanied by incentives, improved access to technology and infrastructure, and knowledge-
sharing (14). Because of the risk of rebound effects, strategic deployment will often have to be 
integrated with mechanisms, such as zoning, that apply over large areas. Environmental and 
agricultural policies need to be coordinated to work in synergy rather than in conflict. 
 
Brazil provides an example of how multiple policy interventions can work together. Natural habitats 
are conserved through several instruments including protected areas, indigenous reserves, and 
Forest Code requirements on private lands (15). Government-subsidized loans are provided to 
farmers to increase productivity on degraded pastureland. Partly due to these initiatives, and 
despite widespread noncompliance with the Forest Code, deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon 
declined steeply after 2004, whereas agricultural production continued to grow. 
 
Whether these trends can be sustained and replicated elsewhere will depend largely on the political 
will to deliver strong environmental governance. There is a risk that environmental regulations will 
be corrupted or diluted by powerful special interests, as happened in Europe with the Common 
Agricultural Policy (16). Further efforts to reduce habitat loss must do so while safeguarding the 
interests of smallholders, as agricultural credit programs in Brazil seek to do by supporting family 
farms. In many parts of the world, higher yields have eroded not only on-farm biodiversity but also 
water, soil, and air quality. Much remains to be done to reduce these impacts by applying improved 
agronomic and agroecological knowledge (17). 
 
Harnessing the potential of higher-yield farming to make space for nature at scales that matter will 
not be straightforward, but the examples described here illustrate that it can be done. The challenge 
is to move on from thinking about higher yields simply as a means to produce more food and to use 
them to free up land for conserving biodiversity and ecosystem services. Reconciling agriculture and 
conservation is one of this century's greatest challenges. We hope that by describing some 
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